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We implement a quantum random number generator based on a balanced homodyne measurement of vacuum
fluctuations of the electromagnetic field. The digitized signal is directly processed with a fast randomness
extraction scheme based on a linear feedback shift register. The random bit stream is continuously read in a
computer at a rate of about 480 Mbit/s and passes an extended test suite for random numbers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various cryptographic schemes, classical or quantum,
require high quality and trusted random numbers for key
generation and other aspects of the protocols. In order
to keep up with data rates in modern communication
schemes, these random numbers need to be generated
at a high rate1. Equally, large amounts of random num-
bers are at the core of Monte Carlo simulation methods2.
Algorithmically generated pseudo-random numbers are
available at very high rates, but are deterministic by def-
inition and are unsuitable for cryptographic purposes, as
they may contain backdoors in the particular algorithm
used to generate them. For applications that require
unpredictable random numbers, physical random num-
ber generators (PRNG) have been used in the past3 and
more recently4. These involve measuring noisy physi-
cal processes and conversion of the outcome into random
numbers. Since it is either practically (e.g. for ther-
mal noise sources) or fundamentally (for certain quan-
tum processes) impossible to predict the outcome of such
measurements, these physically generated random num-
bers are considered “truly” random.
Quantum random number generators (QRNG) belong
to a class of physical random number sources where the
source of randomness is the fundamentally unpredictable
outcome of a quantum measurement. Early PRNG of
this class were based on observing the decay statistics of
radioactive nuclei5,6. More recently, similar PRNG based
on Poisson statistics in optical photon detection were im-
plemented7–11. Different schemes use the randomness of
a single photon scattered by a beam splitter into either of
two output ports12,13. Since the reflection/transmission
of the photon is intrinsically random due to the quantum
nature of the process, the unpredictability of the gen-
erated numbers is ensured14. Other implementations of
QRNGs measure the amplified spontaneous emission15,
the vacuum fluctuations of the electromagnetic field16–18,
or the intensity19,20 and phase noise of different light
sources21–25.
In this paper we report on a quantum random num-
ber generator based on measuring vacuum fluctuations as
the raw source of ramdomness16–18. Such measurements
have a very high bandwidth compared to schemes based
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FIG. 1. Schematic of the quantum random number genera-
tor. A polarizing beam splitter (PBS) distributes the light
of a 780 nm laser diode equally onto two fast photodiodes,
generating photocurrents i1 and i2. The fluctuations in the
photocurrent difference i1 − i2 are amplified, digitized, and
sent to a randomness extractor to generate unbiased “true”
random numbers.
on photon counting7,9, and have a much simpler optical
setup compared to phase noise measurements21–25. Cou-
pled with an efficient randomness extractor, we obtain
an unbiased, uncorrelated stream of random bits at high
speed.
II. IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 1 schematically shows the setup of our QRNG.
A continuous wave laser (wavelength 780nm) is used as
the local oscillator (LO) for the vacuum fluctuations of
the electromagnetic field entering the beam splitter at
the empty port. The output of the beam splitter is di-
rected onto two pin photodiodes, and the photocurrent
difference is processed further. This setup is known as a
balanced homodyne detector26,27 and maps the the elec-
trical field in the second mode entering the beam splitter
to the photocurrent difference i1 − i2. Here, the second
input port is empty, so the homodyne measurement is
probing the vacuum state of the electromagnetic field.
This field fluctuates28, and is used as the source of ran-
domness. As the vacuum field is independent of external
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FIG. 2. Noise levels measured after amplification into a band-
width B = 1kHz. Between 20 and 120MHz, the total noise
is measured from the photocurrent difference i1 − i2 with a
balanced optical power impinging on both photodiodes and
approaches the theoretical shot noise level of -52 dBm (dashed
trace) given by (1). The current i1 of a single photodiode re-
veals colored classical amplitude noise. The electronic noise
is measured without any optical input.
physical quantities, it can not be tampered with. Since
the optical power impinging on the two photodiodes is
balanced, any power fluctuation in the local oscillator
will be simultaneously detected by the two diodes, and
therefore cancel in the photocurrent difference27,29. In
an alternative view, the laser beam can be seen as gen-
erating photocurrents i1, i2 with a shot noise power pro-
portional to the average optical power. The shot noise
currents from the two diodes will add up because they are
uncorrelated, while amplitude fluctuations in the laser in-
tensity (referred to as classical noise) represented by the
average current of the photodiodes does not affect the
photocurrent difference.
The power between the two output ports is balanced
by rotating the laser diode in front of a polarizing beam
splitter (PBS). The output light leaving the PBS is de-
tected by a pair of reversely biased silicon pin photodi-
odes (Hamamatsu S5972) connected in series to perform
the current subtraction. The balancing of the photocur-
rents is monitored by observing the voltage drop across
a resistor RD providing a DC path for the current dif-
ference from the common node to ground. The fluctu-
ations above 20MHz are amplified by a transimpedance
amplifier with a calculated effective transimpedance of
Reff ≈ 540 kΩ.
To ensure that the fluctuations at the output of the
amplifier are dominated by quantum fluctuations of the
vacuum field, the spectral power density at the output
of the amplifier is measured (see Fig. 2). With an opti-
cal power of 3.1mW received by each photodiode corre-
sponding to an average photocurrent I = 1.7mA, a noise
power of P = −53.5 dBm (at 75MHz) in a bandwidth
of B = 1kHz was measured. This is about 1.5 dB lower
than the theoretically expected shot noise value (dashed
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FIG. 3. Autocorrelation of the total noise signal sampled at
60MHz, computed over 106 samples (solid line), compared
with the 2σ confidence level (dashed line).
trace) of
P =
4eIBReff
2
Z
≈ −52 dBm , (1)
where e is the electron charge and Z = 50Ω the load
impedance. The difference is compatible with uncertain-
ties in determining the transimpedance of the amplifier.
The measured total noise after the amplifier has a rela-
tively flat power density in the range of 20 to 120MHz,
while the high pass filters in the circuit suppress low fre-
quency fluctuations. The high end of the pass band is
defined by the cutoff frequency of the amplifier. To illus-
trate the effectiveness of removing classical noise in the
photocurrents, the spectral power density of a photocur-
rent generated from a single diode is also shown. Strong
spectral peaks at various radio frequencies appear that
enter the system probably via the laser diode current.
For completeness, the spectral power density of the elec-
tronic noise of the amplifier is recorded without any light
input, and found to be at least 10 dB below the total
noise level, i.e., the total noise is dominated by quantum
fluctuations.
The amplified total noise signal is digitized into signed
16 bit wide words xi at a sampling rate of 60MHz with an
analog to digital converter (ADC). The sampling rate is
set to be lower than the cut-off frequency of the noise sig-
nal in order to avoid temporal correlation between sam-
ples. As shown in Fig. 3, the normalized autocorrelation
A(d) = 〈xi xi+d〉n/〈x2i 〉n (2)
evaluated over n = 106 measured samples falls into the
expected 2σ confidence interval which indicates no sig-
nificant correlation between samples.
III. ENTROPY ESTIMATION
The total noise we measured before the ADC consists
of both quantum noise and the electronic noise of the de-
3tector. To determine how much randomness we can safely
extract from the system in the sense that it originates
from a quantum process, it is necessary to quantitatively
estimate the entropy contributed by the quantum noise.
To estimate the entropy of the quantum noise H(Xq),
we assume that the measured total noise signal Xt =
Xq + Xe is the sum of independent random variables
Xq for the quantum noise, and Xe for the electronic
noise.20,30. Furthermore, all three variables Xq, Xe and
Xt are assumed to have discrete values between −215 and
215 − 1. Since the origin of electronic noise is uncertain,
we take the worst case scenario that the adversary gains
full knowledge of the electronic noise, i.e., is able to pre-
dict the exact outcome of variable Xe at any moment. In
this case, the accessible amount of randomness in the ac-
quired total noise signal is quantified by the conditional
entropy H(Xt|Xe), i.e. the amount of entropy left in
the total signal, given full knowledge of the electronic
noise Xe. As the variables are assumed to be additive
and independent, the conditional entropy is calculated
as H(Xt|Xe) = H(Xq +Xe|Xe) = H(Xq|Xe) = H(Xq).
The variance of the total noise, σ2t , is given by the
sum of the variances σ2q for the quantum noise, and σ
2
e of
the electronic noise. In an ensemble of 109 samples, we
find σt = 4504.41 and σe = 1481.8, which is measured by
switching off the laser (see Fig. 4). Note that for the total
noise, the observed distribution is slightly skewed com-
pared to a Gaussian distribution [solid line in Fig. 4(a)].
We believe this is due to a distortion in the digitizer.
Assuming the quantum noise Xq has a Gaussian distri-
bution28, we would assign σ2q = σ
2
t − σ2e ≈ 4253.72. To
estimate the entropy for a Gaussian distribution, we use
the Shannon entropy
H(Xq) =
215−1∑
x=−215
−pq(x) log2 pq(x) , (3)
where pq(x)is the probability distribution of the quantum
noise Xq with variance σ
2
q . Since σq ≫ 1, H(Xq) can be
well approximated by
+∞∫
−∞
−f(x) log2 f(x) dx = log2(
√
2pie σq) , (4)
where f(x) is a Gaussian probability density function
with variance σ2q , and e the base of the natural loga-
rithm31. This yields 14.1 bits of entropy per 16-bit sam-
ple.
We note that this numerical estimation of entropy only
serves as an upper bound of extractable randomness, i.e.
the maximum possible amount of entropy one can ex-
tract from the source of randomness under the assump-
tion of a Gaussian distribution of the independent ran-
dom variables Xq and Xe. An alternative estimation of
the entropy in Xq assumes that electronic noise is not
only known to a third party, but also could be tampered
with17,32.
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FIG. 4. Probability distribution of the measured total output
noise with variance σt
2 (a), electronic noise with variance σe
2
(b), and the estimated quantum noise with variance σq
2 (c).
The filled areas in (a), (b) show the actual measurements
over 109 samples, the solid lines approximate the Gaussian
distributions.
IV. RANDOMNESS EXTRACTION
In many applications, random numbers are required
to be not only unpredictable, but also uniformly dis-
tributed. As such, the raw data at the amplifier output
cannot be directly used since they are non-uniformly dis-
tributed. Randomness extraction is the essential process
required to convert our biased raw data into a uniformly
distributed binary stream at the final output33.
Various implementations of randomness extractors
have been reported, such as Trevisan’s extrac-
tor and Toeplitz-hashing extractor30, random-matrix
multiplication20, or the family of secure hashing algo-
rithms (SHA)16.
In this work, we use a randomness extractor based on a
Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). The LFSRs are
well known for quickly generating long pseudo-random
streams with little computational resources and are in
widespread use in communication applications for spec-
trum whitening34–38.
We use a maximum length LFSR with 63 memory cells
and a two-element feedback path. Its state at any time
step t could be represented by 63 binary variables stj ,
with a recursion relation
st+1j = s
t
j−1 for j = 1 . . . 62 , (5)
st+10 = s
t
62 ⊕ st61 , (6)
where ⊕ denotes an exclusive-or operation. The 16 bit
ADC word is serially injected into the feedback path (6)
as s0 with an exclusive or operation,
st+10 = s
t
62 ⊕ st61 ⊕ dt , (7)
where dt represents an input bit from the ADC word at
time t. A reduced number of bits are extracted from s0
obeying the entropy bound. To implement this efficiently
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FIG. 5. Distribution of random data before (blue) and after
(red) the randomness extractor, shown in time domain (left)
and histogram (right).
in parallel for each sampled value of the vacuum field, we
add a second set of memory cells, mj , j = 0 . . . 62, with
the recursion relations
mt+1j = s
t
j for j = 0 . . . 62, (8)
st+1j = m
t
j ⊕mtj+1 ⊕ dtj for j = 0 . . . 61, (9)
st+162 = m
t
62 ⊕ st0 (10)
where dtj represents the j-th bit of the ADC word sam-
pled at t for j < 16, and dtj = 0 for j ≥ 16. Recursion
relations (8-10) are equivalent to the operation described
in (7), but with all input bits dtj of one sampled word in-
jected at once instead of serially. The output bit stream
is a snapshot of eight cells mj with j = 0, 2, 4...14, ex-
tracted at the ADC sampling rate (60 MHz). The extrac-
tion ratio of 50% is lower than 14.1/16 ≈ 88% from the
entropy bound estimated in (4). The recursion equations
(8-10) and the reduced rate extraction is implemented in
a complex programmable logical device (CPLD, Model
LC4256 from Lattice semiconductor).
A merit of this extractor is its low circuit complexity.
Unlike many secure hashing algorithms, it can be easily
implemented either in high speed or low power technol-
ogy. Therefore, the extraction process does not limit the
random number generation rate. This scheme can re-
ceive a parallel injection of up to 63 raw bits per clock
cycle while still following the extractor equations (5) and
(7). With the CPLD operating at its maximum clock
frequency (400 MHz), this algorithm would be able to
process up to 25× 109 raw input bits per second.
V. PERFORMANCE
To evaluate the quality of the extracted random num-
bers, we apply two suites of randomness tests: the statis-
tical test suite from NIST39, and the “Die-harder” ran-
domness test battery40. The output of our RNG passed
both tests consistently when evaluated over a sample of
400Gigabit.
Our implementation reaches an output rate of
480Mbit/s of uniformly distributed random bits, with
the digitizer unit sampling at 60MHz and randomness
extraction ratio of 50%; this is limited by the speed
limit of the data transmission protocol we use (USB2.0).
With a different transmission protocol but the same ADC
sampling, we could extract a random bit rate of up
to 60MHz×14.1 bits or 846Mbit/s. With moderate ef-
fort, the random number generation rate can be greatly
increased by extending the bandwidth of the photodi-
odes, amplifiers, and digitizer devices, while maintain-
ing the relatively simple randomness extraction mecha-
nism. Practically, the resolution-bandwidth product of
the ADC will then limit the random bit generation rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we demonstrated a random number gen-
eration scheme by measuring the vacuum fluctuations of
the electromagnetic field. By estimating the amount of
usable entropy from quantum noise and using an effi-
cient randomness extractor based on linear feedback shift
registers, we are able to generate uniformly distributed
random numbers at a high rate from a fundamentally
unpredictable quantum measurement.
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